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FOREWORD
The Personnel and Management Technical Area of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts a continuing research program to provide the Army personnel management system with ways to identify and select good leaders and evaluate their performance. ARI Research Reports 1172, 1173, and 1182 describe previous research on officer performance using an Officer Evaluation Center (OEC) simulation. This report analyzes the OEC data in order to discover the relationship between officer performance in different situations and leader characteristics of military knowledge and decisiveness.
The OEC research was originally done under Army Research and Development Project 2Q062106A722, Officer Prediction, in support of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). The continuing technology base research on officer careers, responsive to the DCSPER, was conducted under Army Project 2Q162717A766 in FY 1978 and 2Q162722A766 in FY 1979 . 
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADER KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTIVE BEHAVIOR, AND PERFORMANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE, TECHNICAL, AND COMBAT SITUATIONS
BRIEF
Requirement:
To find to what extent two broad characteristics of officer leader behavior--military knowledge and directiveness/decisiveness--are associated with level of performance in the three majoi areas of officer assignments--combat, technical, and administrative.
Procedure:
Using data acquired in ARI's officer prediction research, four groups of officers were identified: high knowledge, high decisiveness; high knowledge, low decisiveness; low knowledge, high decisiveness; and low knowledge, low decisiveness. Performance scores and observations of decisiveness were obtained for officers in these groups. Analysis was performed separately for technical knowledge and tactical knowledge.
Findings;
Both military knowledge and decisiveness were, as hypothesized, found to be positively related to superior performance.
Military knowledge, whether technical or tactical in content, was found to be more important in administrative and technical problem situations. Directiveness//decisiveness was markedly more important to successful performance in combat situations.
Utilization:
The Officer Evaluation Center in a general sense constituted a systems measurement bed which brought together a large number of varying factors, personal and situational, so that selected factors could be studied in interaction. The relationships established can be useful to both research and management in developing, consistent with events, improved procedures for officer career management.
The present analysis has confirmed the importance of officer leadership style to effective performance in assignments having different requirements. 
BACKGROUND
Early identification of officer leaders and development of officer leadership from cadet training through company and field grade assignments are of major concern in the management of the Army's manpower resources. The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts research to provide scientific means of identifying individuals with good leadership potential for officer training, selecting officers for commissioning, and evaluating their performance. Differential prediction and evaluation have become dominant objectives in the effort to channel officers into appropriate assignments and develop their potential so as to make best use of their abilities.
Research on the relationship of leadership styles to effective performaice has concentrated to a considerable extent on two approaches:
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(1) the effects of different behavioral styles on group performance and career satisfaction, and (2) tne differential effectiveness of leadership styles in situations differing in leader-follower task relationships. Concep-such as initiation of structure and personal consideration (e.g., Stogdill, 1974; Fleishman, 1973) have been developed and investigated in the first approach; concepts such as task orientation versus person-relationship orientation and definition of dimensions of favorableness (e.g., Fiedler, 1974) have been developed and investigated in the second approach. Concurrently, the Army's research on officer leadership has developed and validated realistic assessment processes for measuring leader behavior. This has led to the use of "test beds," in which the situational demands are defined, and it has yielded constructs interrelating leader characteristics, leader behaviors, and situational requirements (e.g., Uhlaner, 1970 Uhlaner, , 1975 Uhlaner, , 1978 Helme, Willemin, & Grafton, 1971 , 1974 Helme, Willemin & Day, 1971) .
Officer prediction research was undertaken by ARI to meet the need to improve the selection and assignment of personnel for different of. Lcer leadership positions. Analysis of duties performed by officers pointed initially to three groups of officer a.'signments--combat, technical, and administrative--which appeared to call for different patterns of leader behavior. The basic research design was longitudinal. Experimental measures were obtained on officers innediate)'i after their entry on active duty, and performance evaluations were obtained at subsequent points in the officers' careers. From the original sample of 4,000, 900 officers were selected in the later phase of the program, as representative of various branches of service. These officers took part in an experimentally controlled 3-day exercise at the Officer Evaluation Center (OEC) established for the purpose at Fort McClellan, 4 Ala. The scenario for the exercise presented the officer with 15 problem A 1 1 situations, 5 each in combat, technical, and administrative settings ( Figure 1 ). The problem situations were designed to yield objective Q recorded data on specific details of each officer's performance, as well as jud .'.ntal. evaluations of style of behavior and effectiveness in aspects of each task ani in each situation.
In addition to the evaluations of officer performance obtained at the OEC, ratings were obtained of all officers who had taken the Differential Officer Battery, which measures a variety of knowledges, skills, and aptitudes, at entry on active duty.
Criterion data were analyzed to yield information about the officers--the requirements of their jobs, the various ways in which they carried out their responsibilities as leaders, and what general modes of behavior characterized good and poor accomplishment of various missions. Analysis of test and criterion data revealed characteristics of officers who would be likely to succeed or to perform less well as officers.
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The ARI Eelection research program enhanced the value of the procedures and provided useful measures of general verbal and quantitative ability at higher levels. Measurement of personal attributes had yiclded only modest predictive validity. The major contribution from the research findings was the realization that leadership behavior was highly complex and that the situation in which it was evaluated would have to be considered fully. A major contribution of the evaluation _ segment of the research was to define more clearly this requirement for new evaluation approaches, particularly those emphasizing the situation in which leadership behavior was to be evaluated.
ARI's program in this area continues to be a many-faceted attack on major officer personnel problems--improved methods for selection, assignment, and promotion actions; continuing reevaluation of each officer's potential in terms of available career assignments; and development of a new research-based system of performance evaluation respon-* sive to particular Army needs for given personnel decisions. This research utilizes ARI's experience with simulating leadership problem situations, with its implications for adapting officer training exercises to individual meisurement, for applying modcls in design and testing of officer evaluation systems and subsystems, and for computerassisted simulation and feedback.
Research on officer prediction has dcne mote than provide precommissioning measures. The behavioral dimeiision! have helped shape the constructs that are being used in research to develop a system for selecting and evaluating officers that meets the changing patterns of officer career development. 
Research methodology has been developed to support the measurement of performance by means which also consider the elusive noncognitive and situational elements influencing performance.
OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS
The research program outlined ab,.e addressed the interrelationship of leader characteristics, leadership behaviors, and mission accomplishment in different military situations. From the comprehensive data of the entry test battery and the nearly 2,000 observations and evaluations of performance obtained in the 15 situations at OEC, measures of knowledges, skills, behaviors, and effectiveness were derived by factor analysis and logical interpretation. The data analysis in the present phase of the research, reported here, was concerned specifically with the interrelationship of leader knowledge, style of behavior, and mission accomplishment in the three situational categories--combat, technical, and administrative. As indicated by the design of the research program, these situations were embedded in an overall combat environment under the time constraints, input overload, and simulated combat stregs of that environment.
The principal hypotheses investigated were (a) that both a high level of military knowledge and leadership behavior characterized by a high level of directiveness-decisiveness would be positively related to superior performance in an officer, and (b) that high directiveness would be more important to performance in combat situations, and high knowledge more important to performance in technical and administrative situations.
DESIGN OF THE ANALYSIS
To test these hypotheses, a sample of over 600 lieutenants, chosen from participants in the officer prediction research program, was divided into high and low military knowledge groups on the basis of the tests taken on entry to active duty, previously validated in the original sample. The 600-man sample was partitioned twice: first, on the basis of knowledge of military tactics, and second on the basis of knowledge of military technology operations. Each officer was then evaluated on directiveness of leadership behavior in one situational context. Finally, each officer was evaluated bn mission accomplishment in each of the 15 simulated combat situations. The mission-accomplishment evaluation for the situation in which directiveness had been judged was omitted from the analysis, in order to avoid rater halo or rater assumption that directiveness was nececsarily positive. Criterion data of mission accomplishment %ere also dichotomized.
Scores and evaluations were tabulated separately for each situation in which directiveness/decisiveness was observed and also for each situation in which performance of the task or mission was evaluated. In situations where the officer worked alone on data and instructions that were provided--for example, producing a staff document--no observation of decisiveness could be made. In combat comnand situations, two separate estimates of decisiveness were made. One performance evaluation was made in each of the 15 situations. Thesa were "total scores"--the weighted sums of separate observations and ev luations. Table 1 lists the specific observations used to estimate de~isiveness and the 15 situations on which total performance scores were obtained.
RESULTS
The data consisted of mean performance scores for each of four groups: high kno, edge, high decisiveness; high knowledge, low decisiveness; low knowledge, high decisiveness; and low knowledge, low decisiveness. Since the analysis was performed separately for tactical These analyses yielded F-ratios that proved highly significant for the main effects of knowledge and decisiveness, but in only a few instances (although well above chance incidence) in interaction variance. A summary of findings on the F-ratios is given in Tables 2 and 3 . Technical knowledge accounted for significant variance in performance in 62% of the effects analyzed, decisiveness in 80%, and interaction in 22%. Tactical knowledge accounted for significant variance in 85%, decisiveness in 81%, and interaction in 20% of the effects analyzed.
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Given these findings of substantial significance, the next step ] was to estimate the percentage of variance accounted for by each effect, using Winer's method (1971, pp. 428-430) . Table 4 shows the percentage of variance in performance in 15 situational tasks attributable to f technical knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction. The mean variance explained by technical knowledge was 4.00%; by decisiveness, 6.39%; and by interaction, 0.85%. Table 5 shows the same statistics for tactical knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction. The mean variance explained by tactical knowledge was 3.67%; by decisiveness, 6.53%; and by interaction, 0.74%. These results clearly showed that across all situations, decisiveness accounted for a substantial majority of the performance variance explained.
On closer examination, however, Tables 4 and 5 reveal that in administrative and technical tasks involving no interaction with subordinates or colleagues, performance variance attributable to knowledge exceeded that attributable to decisiveness except in one highly complex task, the communications exhibit. Strikingly, the reverse result was found for the combat command tasks, especially for the road damage and radiation survey task, a command-and-control task lasting 8 hours (the longest of the problem situations) that imposed extreme pressures of emergency decision and input overload. Here aga.i, knowledge--whether technical or tactical--was found to be more important in administrative task situations; decisiveness wes more important in technical task situations. Decisiveness was markedly more I important in ccbat task situations. The foregoing data are presented A graphically in Figures 2 and 3 . two task categories) were averaged and compared with the average of the nine decisiveness measures in the combat situations.
The results (Table 6 ) demonstrated that in the technical task situations, technical knowledge contributed more to performance variance than decisiveness did (6.44 vs. 4.84), but that the reverse was found for decisiveness observed in combat command tasks (2.41 vs. 7.75). Tactical knowledge, however, contributed less to performance in all tasks than did decisiveness in technical staff situations (3.25 vs. 5.38). The difference was even greater when decisiveness was observed in combat situations (3.97 vs. 7.49). Apparently, decisiveness itself may also be responsive to situational demands and to an officer's particular expertise. To put it another way, an officer can be more decisive if he or she knows what to be decisive about. Fig-are 4 shows these data graphically. 
CONCLUSIONS
The results suggested support for the first hypothesis: that the leader's military knowledge and decisiveness of behavior are highly related to effectiveness of performance in a wide range of task situations. In the test bed of a simulated combat emergency, evidence in--dicates that knowledge and decisiveness are important to performance. Tables 4 and 5 show that measures of knowledge account for from 2.4% to 5% of the variance in performance of given tasks, with no consistent differences among the categories of administrative, Lechnical, and combat tasks. The mean variance accounted for by decisiveness, while I showing wider differences, was 6.39% and 6.53% when analyzed in connection with technical knowledge and tactical knowledge, respectively. The evidence for the second hypothesis--that decisiveness is more important in combat situations and that knowledge is more important in administrative and technical situations--is also strong. The variance accounted for by decisiveness is far greater in the combat tasks, ranging from 7.4% to 16%, as compared to a range of 1.9% to 7.6% in the administrative and technical tasks.
The Officer Evaluation Center provided a setting in which varying factors of environment, type of mission, interpersonal relationships, situational problems, and stresses were brought together. The officers brought their different capabilities and individual ways of dealing with problems and interacting with environmental and situational factors. The results are generalizable beyond the specific situations, and, with come caution, to major dimensions of leadership and officer performance. 
